Edinburgh logic group is Philosophy Society’s weekly logic-related reading group, and a general PhilSoc hub for all things logical. Originally intended as a short series to gauge interest for a logic reading group in the 2020/21 academic year, and provisionally entitled the wordy Edinburgh University Philosophy Society Philosophy of Logic Reading Group, it had its first meeting in early April 2020. Turns out logic is fun, so Logic group has run continuously since then. In that time, we’ve discussed all sorts—normativity, intuitionsim, future contingents, anumāna, pluralism, and the catuṣkoṭi, as some examples—and look forward to exploring even more of the possible worlds (some impossible ones too).
2020/21 themed blocks
Numbers correspond to the week in the block (we normally meet Friday 19.00 UK time). Links to the readings will be available on the FB page and the Discord.
Consequence (October 2020)
- S. Haack: ‘Validity’ in Philosophy of logics (2/10)
- A. Tarski: ‘On the concept of logical consequence’ in Logic, semantics, metamathematics (9/10)
- G. Ray: ‘Logical consequence: A defense of Tarski’. Journal of Philosophical Logic (16/10)
- G. Restall: ‘Truth values and proof theory’ (on consequently.org) (23/10)
- R. Brandom: ‘From logical expressivism to expressivist logic’. Philosophical Issues (30/10)
Antiexceptionalism (November 2020)
- W. V. O Quine: ‘What price bivalence?’. Journal of Philosophy. and §5 of W. V. O. Quine: ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’. Philosophical Review (6/11)
- G. Russell: ‘The justification of the basic laws of logic’. Journal of Philosophical Logic (13/11)
- T. Williamson: ‘Semantic paradoxes and abductive methodology’ in Reflections on the liar (ed. B. Armour-Garb) (20/11)
- J. Beall: ‘On Williamson’s new Quinean argument against nonclassical logic’. Australasian Journal of Logic (27/11)