Logic Group

Edinburgh logic group is Philosophy Society’s weekly logic-related reading group, and a general PhilSoc hub for all things logical. Originally intended as a short series to gauge interest for a logic reading group in the 2020/21 academic year, and provisionally entitled the wordy Edinburgh University Philosophy Society Philosophy of Logic Reading Group, it had its first meeting in early April 2020. Turns out logic is fun, so Logic group has run continuously since then (except for a summer break in 2021). In that time, we’ve discussed all sorts—normativity, intuitionsim, future contingents, anumāna, pluralism, and the catuṣkoṭi, as some examples—and look forward to exploring even more of the possible worlds (some impossible ones too).

Up-to-date information on upcoming Logic group events is available at the PhilSoc Facebook page. There’s also a channel on the PhilSoc Discord for discussion (get in touch for a join link).

2020/21 themed blocks

Numbers correspond to the week in the block (we normally meet Friday 19.00 UK time). Links to the readings will be available on the FB page and the Discord.

Consequence (October 2020)

  1. S. Haack: ‘Validity’ in Philosophy of logics (2/10)
  2. A. Tarski: ‘On the concept of logical consequence’ in Logic, semantics, metamathematics (9/10)
  3. G. Ray: ‘Logical consequence: A defense of Tarski’. Journal of Philosophical Logic (16/10)
  4. G. Restall: ‘Truth values and proof theory’ (on consequently.org) (23/10)
  5. R. Brandom: ‘From logical expressivism to expressivist logic’. Philosophical Issues (30/10)

Antiexceptionalism (November 2020)

  1. W. V. O Quine: ‘What price bivalence?’. Journal of Philosophy. and §5 of W. V. O. Quine: ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’. Philosophical Review (6/11)
  2. G. Russell: ‘The justification of the basic laws of logic’. Journal of Philosophical Logic (13/11)
  3. T. Williamson: ‘Semantic paradoxes and abductive methodology’ in Reflections on the liar (ed. B. Armour-Garb) (20/11)
  4. J. Beall: ‘On Williamson’s new Quinean argument against nonclassical logic’. Australasian Journal of Logic (27/11)

The Australian Plan (January–February 2021)

  1. R. K. Meyer & E. P. Martin: ‘Logic on the Australian plan’. J. Philos. Log. (29/1)
  2. J. Beall &al.: ‘On the ternary relation and conditionality’. J. Philos. Log. (5/2)
  3. G. Restall: ‘Negation in relevant logics (How I stopped worrying and learned to love the Routley star)’. [Tech. report, ANU] (on consequently.org) (12/2)
  4. F. Berto & G. Restall: ‘Negation on the Australian plan’. J. Philos. Log. (19/2)
  5. N. Francez: ‘Another plan for negation’. Australasian J. Log. (26/2)

Gaps and gluts in African logic (March 2021)

  1. J. E. Wiredu: ‘Truth as a logical constant, with an application to the principle of excluded middle’ Philos. Q. (12/3)
  2. V. Ocaya: ‘Logic in the Acholi language’. A companion to African philosophy (Blackwell) (19/3)
  3. J. O. Chimakonam: ‘Ezumezu: A variant of three-valued logic: Insights and controversies’ (26/3)