Logic Group

Edinburgh logic group is Philosophy Society’s weekly logic-related reading group, and a general PhilSoc hub for all things logical. Originally intended as a short series to gauge interest for a logic reading group in the 2020/21 academic year, and provisionally entitled the wordy Edinburgh University Philosophy Society Philosophy of Logic Reading Group, it had its first meeting in early April 2020. Turns out logic is fun, so Logic group has run continuously since then (except for a summer break in 2021). In that time, we’ve discussed all sorts—normativity, intuitionsim, future contingents, anumāna, pluralism, and the catuṣkoṭi, as some examples—and look forward to exploring even more of the possible worlds (some impossible ones too).

Up-to-date information on upcoming Logic group events is available at the PhilSoc Facebook page. There’s also a channel on the PhilSoc Discord for discussion (get in touch for a join link).

2022/23 themed blocks

The first block for the forthcoming academic year is the Possible Worlds (others will be announced soon); meetings will begin on Monday 16th January. Numbers correspond to the week in the block (we meet Mondays 19.00 UK time in The Balcony Room at Teviot). Links to the readings will be available on the FB page and the Discord.

Texts From Quine’s From a Logical Point of View (March 2023)

  1. Meaning. V. W.O. Quine: “Meaning and Existential Inference”, Chap. 9 in From a Logical Point of View (160-9). New York: Harper-Torchwood (6/3)
  2. Analyticity and Reductionism. V. W.O. Quine: “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, Chap. 2 in From a Logical Point of View (20-47). (13/3)
  3. Mathematical Logic. V. W. O. Quine: “Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis”, Chap. 4 in From a Logical Point of View (65-79). (20/3)

Possible Worlds (January/February 2023)

  1. Counterpart Theory. David K. Lewis: Counterfactuals (pp. 36–41 and 84–91) Oxford: Blackwell (16/1).
  2. Realism and Anti-Realism. John Divers: “What Possible World Talk Means“, in Possible Worlds (Problems of Philosophy) (pp. 15-25) London: Routledge (23/1)
  3. Remedial Chaos Theory. Community: “Remedial Chaos Theory” (dir. Jeff Melman) NBC. (30/1) PLEASE NOTE: There is no required reading for this week’s session, we shall be screening the episode at the venue during the event. Of course, if you do wish to watch it beforehand, then by all means do so, who are we to stop you (And it’s a very good episode)?

Previous themed blocks


Deflationary Theory of Truth (September/October 2022)

  1. Introduction to Deflationism. F. P. Ramsey: “Facts and  Propositions” (pp. 153-70) in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes (26/9)
  2. No Such Thing as Truth? A. J. Ayer: “The Criterion of Truth” (pp. 28-32) in Analysis (3/10)
  3. Performative Theory of Truth. P. F. Strawson: “Truth” (pp. 83-97) in Analysis (10/10)
  4. Contemporary Deflationism. R. Brandom: “Pragmatism, Phenomenalism, and Truth Talk” (pp. 75-93) in Midwest Studies in Philosophy (17/10)
  5. Rebuttals to Deflationism. M. Dummett: “Truth” (pp. 141-62) in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (24/10)

Logical Pluralism (October/November 2022)

  1. Logical Pluralism. J. C. Beall & Greg Restall: “Logical Pluralism” (pp. 475-493) in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (7/11)
  2. Rebuttal to Pluralism. Stephen Read: “Monism: The One True Logic” (pp. 193-209) in A Logic Approach to Philosophy. (14/11)
  3. A Four Valued Logic. Nuel D. Belnap: “A Useful Four-Valued Logic” (pp. 55-76) in New Essays on Belnap-Dunn Logic (21/11)


Consequence (October 2020)

  1. S. Haack: ‘Validity’ in Philosophy of logics (2/10)
  2. A. Tarski: ‘On the concept of logical consequence’ in Logic, semantics, metamathematics (9/10)
  3. G. Ray: ‘Logical consequence: A defense of Tarski’. Journal of Philosophical Logic (16/10)
  4. G. Restall: ‘Truth values and proof theory’ (on consequently.org) (23/10)
  5. R. Brandom: ‘From logical expressivism to expressivist logic’. Philosophical Issues (30/10)

Antiexceptionalism (November 2020)

  1. W. V. O Quine: ‘What price bivalence?’. Journal of Philosophy. and §5 of W. V. O. Quine: ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’. Philosophical Review (6/11)
  2. G. Russell: ‘The justification of the basic laws of logic’. Journal of Philosophical Logic (13/11)
  3. T. Williamson: ‘Semantic paradoxes and abductive methodology’ in Reflections on the liar (ed. B. Armour-Garb) (20/11)
  4. J. Beall: ‘On Williamson’s new Quinean argument against nonclassical logic’. Australasian Journal of Logic (27/11)

The Australian Plan (January–February 2021)

  1. R. K. Meyer & E. P. Martin: ‘Logic on the Australian plan’. J. Philos. Log. (29/1)
  2. J. Beall &al.: ‘On the ternary relation and conditionality’. J. Philos. Log. (5/2)
  3. G. Restall: ‘Negation in relevant logics (How I stopped worrying and learned to love the Routley star)’. [Tech. report, ANU] (on consequently.org) (12/2)
  4. F. Berto & G. Restall: ‘Negation on the Australian plan’. J. Philos. Log. (19/2)
  5. N. Francez: ‘Another plan for negation’. Australasian J. Log. (26/2)

Gaps and gluts in African logic (March 2021)

  1. J. E. Wiredu: ‘Truth as a logical constant, with an application to the principle of excluded middle’ Philos. Q. (12/3)
  2. V. Ocaya: ‘Logic in the Acholi language’. A companion to African philosophy (Blackwell) (19/3)
  3. J. O. Chimakonam: ‘Ezumezu: A variant of three-valued logic: Insights and controversies’ (26/3)